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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Regan Mojok Adeng appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance, methamphetamine, possession of a controlled substance, 
marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia.  Specifically, Mr. Adeng contends that 
the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress because he was subject to 
custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
  
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 The following facts are taken from the district court’s order denying Mr. Adeng’s 
motion to suppress and Defendant’s Exhibit A, which is recording of the police response 
in this matter.  Mr. Adeng does not believe the facts to be in dispute.  In the early 
morning of June 25, 2014, Officers Canfield and Martinez of the Boise Police 
Department responded to a Maverick service station in response to a tip concerning a 
possible domestic battery.  (R., p.79.)  The officers made contact with Mr. Adeng in the 
parking lot, where he found in close proximity to a woman’s purse laying on the ground 
near a dumpster.  (R., p.79.)   
 Officer Martinez believed that Mr. Adeng was connected to the purse because 
the caller observed the man and woman struggling over a purse and because he 
observed Mr. Adeng move away from the purse as he approached.  (R., p.79.)  
Because Mr. Adeng matched the caller’s description of the male involved in the 
altercation, Officer Canfield instructed Mr. Adeng to sit on the curb while he investigated 
the report.  (R., p.79.)  The officers conceded that Mr. Adeng was not free to leave at 
any time during the ensuing investigation, which lasted approximately thirty-four minutes 
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prior to the defendant being placed in handcuffs, although they did not inform Mr. Adeng 
of this.  (R., pp.79-80.)   
 Officer Martinez positioned his squad car in the alleyway and Officer Canfield’s 
car was parked in the parking lot.  (R., p.80.)  Neither of the cars’ emergency lights were 
activated.  (R., p.80.)   
 After Mr. Adeng was seated at the curb, Officer Canfield began questioning him 
by attempting to ascertain the location and identity of the woman involved in the 
altercation.  (R., p.80.)  Mr. Adeng was calm and respectful but did not provide the 
name of the woman or her whereabouts.  (R., p.80.)  He acknowledged that there had 
been an altercation with a friend but denied any wrongdoing.  (R., p.80.)  Officer 
Canfield repeatedly asked Mr. Adeng who the female was and at one point told 
Mr. Adeng he would arrest him for possession of stolen property if he refused to identify 
her.  (Defendant’s Exhibit A at 2:00-6:30.) 
 The police then located the woman, Sara Cummings, in the restroom of the 
Maverick store.  (R., p.80.)  When interviewed by Officer Canfield, Ms. Cummings 
confirmed that she had argued with Mr. Adeng but denied that he had committed any 
crime toward her.  (R., p.80.)  The officers observed that Ms. Cummings had a fat lip 
that appeared to have been recently inflicted.  (R., p.80.)   
 Officer Canfield then questioned Mr. Adeng about the injury; he acknowledged 
that their confrontation became physical and his forearm connected with 
Ms. Cummings’s mouth in self-defense.  (R., p.80.)  Ms. Cummings then confirmed that 
there had been a physical dimension to the altercation but she had no desire to press 
any charges against Mr. Adeng.  (R., p.80.)   
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 Officer Canfield then questioned Mr. Adeng again, informed him that 
Ms. Cumming was “telling a story over there,” and plainly implied that Ms. Cummings’ 
account of events contradicted Mr. Adeng’s.  (R., p.81.)  Officer Canfield then asserted 
that the evidence looked bad for Mr. Adeng, that Ms. Cummings was obviously injured, 
and that her purse had been abandoned in such a manner that it appeared that 
Mr. Adeng had wrongfully taken possession of it in the course of a possible battery.  
(R., p.81.)   
 Officer Canfield asked Mr. Adeng if he had any of Ms. Cummings’ property on 
him; Mr. Adeng refused to consent to a search of his person and stated that he did not 
want to get Ms. Cummings in trouble.  (R., p.81.)  The questioning then intensified.  
(R., p.81.)  The officers then told Mr. Adeng that he was making them nervous and 
Officer Canfield instructed him not to reach into his pockets.  (R., p.82.)  Specifically, 
based on his statement that he feared getting Ms. Cummings into trouble if he were 
searched, the officers inferred that Mr. Adeng might be carrying a weapons, drugs, or 
drug paraphernalia.  (R., p.82.)  The officers also testified that Mr. Adeng became more 
evasive and physically agitated.  (R., p.82.)   
 Officer Canfield then asked Mr. Adeng if he would consent to be patted down for 
weapons, and Mr. Adeng responded by standing up and shaking his head “no” in 
response to the question, “do you mind if we pat you down for weapons?”  (R., p.82.)  
Officer Canfield then patted Mr. Adeng down while restraining Mr. Adeng’s hands 
behind his back.  (R., p.82.)  Mr. Adeng eventually conceded that he had a pipe; once 
the officers retrieved it, they arrested Mr. Adeng, placed him in handcuffs, and moved 
him into the back of one of the patrol cars, where he was finally given Miranda 
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warnings.  (R., pp.82-83.)  In a search incident to arrest, officer located additional items 
of drugs and paraphernalia.  (R., p.83.)   
 Mr. Adeng was charged with possession of a controlled substance, 
methamphetamine, possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, possession of a 
controlled substance, alprazolam, and possession of drug paraphernalia.  (R., p.34.)  
He filed a motion to suppress, asserting that he was in custody for purposes of Miranda 
and he was not given the requisite warnings.  (R., p.49.)  The district court denied the 
motion, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, Mr. Adeng was not in 
custody.  (R., p.78.)   
At a jury trial, he was acquitted of possession of alprazolam but found guilty of 
the remaining charges.  (R., pp.131-134.)    
The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years 
fixed, for possession of methamphetamine, and 180 days on the misdemeanor charges.  
(R., p.143.)  Mr. Adeng then filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for reduction of 
sentence, which was granted; the court retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.158, 159.)  
Following the retained jurisdiction program, the court suspended the sentences and 
placed Mr. Adeng on probation.  (R., p.167.)   
Mr. Adeng appealed.  (R., p.152.)  He asserts that the district court erred by 
denying his motion to suppress.   
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Adeng’s motion to suppress because he was 
subject to custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Adeng’s Motion To Suppress 
 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Adeng moved to suppress the statements made during police questioning 
prior to his arrest. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Mr. Adeng was 
not “in custody” during the police questioning. Mr. Adeng submits that the district court 
erred by denying his motion. Based on the totality of the circumstances, Mr. Adeng was 
subject to “custodial interrogation” during the questioning. 
  
B. Standard Of Review 
This Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a 
motion to suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also State v. 
Hunter, 156 Idaho 568, 571 (Ct. App. 2014) (same). This Court will accept the trial 
court’s findings of fact “unless they are clearly erroneous.” State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 
416, 418 (2014). “At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of 
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is 
vested in the trial court.” State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584, 587 (Ct. App. 2013). This Court 
exercises free review of “the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to the 
facts found.” Danney, 153 Idaho at 408. 
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C. The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Adeng’s Motion To Suppress 
 
“Miranda v. Arizona1 requires that a person be informed of his or her Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prior to custodial interrogation; 
otherwise, incriminating statements are inadmissible.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 
795 (2003). “Miranda warnings are required where a suspect is ‘in custody’” and subject 
to an “interrogation.” State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 576 (2010); Hansen, 138 Idaho at 
795. The prosecution cannot use statements stemming from the custodial interrogation 
of a defendant “unless the questioning was preceded by what later became known as 
Miranda warnings.” State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 128 (2010). “[T]he person must be 
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be 
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, 
either retained or appointed.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. If the defendant provides a 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights, the defendant’s 
statements made during a custodial interrogation may be admitted at trial. State v. 
Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 60 n.7 (2011); State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 519, 523 (2002). 
In this case, the district court held that Mr. Adeng was not in custody.  (R., p.78.)  
Mr. Adeng respectfully disagrees, and asserts that, under the totality of the 
circumstances, he was subject to custodial interrogation.  Mr. Adeng acknowledges that 
he was not formally arrested at the time of the questioning, but he asserts that he was 
“in custody” for Miranda purposes because his freedom was restrained to a similar 
degree. “A person is in custody whenever subjected to a restraint on his or her liberty in 
any degree similar to a formal arrest.” Hansen, 138 Idaho at 795 (citations omitted). “To 
                                            
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  
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determine whether custody has attached, ‘a court must examine all of the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation.’” James, 148 Idaho at 577 (quoting 
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994)). 
Factors to be considered may include the degree of restraint on the 
person’s freedom of movement (including whether the person is placed in 
handcuffs), whether the subject is informed that the detention is more than 
temporary, the location and visibility of the interrogation, whether other 
individuals were present, the number of questions asked, the duration of 
the interrogation or detention, the time of the interrogation, the number of 
officers present, the number of officers involved in the interrogation, the 
conduct of the officers, and the nature and manner of the questioning. 
 
State v. Christensen, 159 Idaho 339, 351 (Ct. App. 2015). “The test is an objective one 
and ‘the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would 
have understood his situation.’” James, 148 Idaho at 577 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 
468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984)). 
While he had not been formally arrested, Mr. Adeng submits that the totality of 
the circumstances point to Mr. Adeng being in custody during the interrogation.  
Mr. Adeng was held for over thirty-three minutes, was told to sit down on a curb and 
was not allowed to leave the area.  The interrogation took place outside at a gas station 
at 3:30 a.m., while it was dark outside.  Mr.  Adeng was asked numerous questions over 
a thirty minute period.  There were three officers present and two were involved in the 
interrogation.   
Further, the officers were deceptive during the interrogation.  The officers were 
responding to a reported incident and continued to interrogate Mr. Adeng even after 
they have unequivocally been told by Ms. Cummings that nothing happened, no crime 
had occurred, and she did not wish to pursue charges.  Despite Ms. Cummings’s 
statements, the officers told Mr. Adeng a different account, suggesting that 
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Ms. Cummings had made statements incriminating him, in order to continue 
interrogating him. 
Mr. Adeng was also subject to interrogation. The term “interrogation” under 
Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the 
part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response from the suspect.  Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-302 
(1980).  Mr. Adeng was repeatedly questioned concerning whether he attacked 
Ms. Cummings.  (Defendant’s Exhibit A at 15:00-20.)  He was also questioned as to 
whether he had stolen the purse.  (Defendant’s Exhibit A at 2:00-6:30.)  These types of 
questions are clearly designed to elicit an incriminating response. 
After Ms. Cummings answered all of the officers’ questions and clearly indicated 
to the officers that no crime had occurred, she was not the victim of any crime, and that 
she did not wish to press any charges against Mr. Adeng, there was absolutely no 
reason to continue interrogating Mr. Adeng.  Instead, the officer still repeatedly 
questioned Mr. Adeng as to whether he had injured Ms. Cummings, and the 
interrogating him as to whether he had Ms. Cummings’ property on his person.  It was 
only in response to this custodial interrogation that Mr. Adeng agreed to a pat down 
search.  Mr. Adeng submits that his responses to the questions, as well as the results of 
the search, should have been suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree.  See Wong 
Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 (1963).   
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Adeng respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction 
and reverse the order denying his motion to suppress. 
 DATED this 10th day of February, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      JUSTIN M. CURTIS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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